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 REFORMING FEDERALISM:  
A PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHENING THE 
AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION 
 
Abstract 
 
The drafters of the Australian Constitution favoured federalism due to its recognised 
advantages in providing for individual choice and checking concentration of power. 
However, the massive shift of power to the centre over these years has meant that 
many of the advantages of federalism are no longer realised. Australia’s federalism is 
clearly no longer working. Unless the federal structure undergoes a formal reform, 
some of the most important advantages of Australian’s federalism may eventually 
disappear. This article thus provides practical solutions aiming at strengthening the 
manifold advantages of federalism for Australia. 
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REFORMING FEDERALISM:  
A PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHENING THE 
AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In drafting the Australian Constitution, the framers sought to maintain a federal 
balance in the distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the states. They 
designed the Constitution to be an instrument of government intended to distribute 
and limit governmental powers. Such distribution and limitation upon governmental 
powers was deliberately chosen by them because of the well-substantiated 
understanding that the concentration of power is often inimical to the achievement of 
human freedom and happiness.1  
This article summarises the main characteristics of a federal system as a system of 
government worthy of protecting: it controls power, safeguards democracy, and 
promotes liberty. And yet, it also explains that the interpretative approach preferred 
by the High Court since the 1920’s has expanded Commonwealth powers to the point 
where many of the advantages of federalism have now been lost. Centralisation 
indeed has been an on-going pursuit by the Commonwealth, aided by the High Court. 
This being so, the final part of this paper considers the great need for reforming our 
‘dysfunctional’ federal system, thus offering the potential agenda for a comprehensive 
reform of the Australian Federation. 
        
                                                 
1  See: New South Wales v Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) (2006) 229 CLR 1, [555] (Kirby J).  
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2. Characteristics of Federalism 
The first federal states emerged via the coming together of a number of established 
polities that wished to preserve their separate identities and to some extent their 
autonomy.2 Some features are common to most, if not all, federal systems: 
distribution of power between central and local governments; a written and rigid 
constitution; an independent and impartial umpire to decide on disputes between these 
levels of government; and representation of regional views within the central 
government.   
The type of political decentralisation provided by federalism is in contrast to a unitary 
system of government, which consists of one sovereign or central government. 
Although there may be regional units in unitary systems, any authority vested in them 
is merely delegated by the central government and can be resumed by it. In contrast, 
the central feature of federalism is the separation of powers between central and 
regional governments in such a way that each of them cannot encroach upon the 
power of another. A V Dicey explained:3  
The distribution of powers is an essential feature of federalism. The object for 
which a federal state is formed involves a division of authority between the 
national government and the separate States. The powers given to the nation 
form in effect so many limitations upon the authority of the separate States, and 
as it is not intended that the central government should have the opportunity of 
encroaching upon the rights retained by the States, its sphere of action 
necessarily becomes the object of rigorous definition.  
In federal systems the regional government enjoys a great degree of political 
autonomy derived directly from the written Constitution. A federal Constitution is 
therefore one which divides legislative power between a central government (Union 
or Commonwealth) and regional (state or provincial) governments. Such a 
constitution cannot be amendable unilaterally by any of the spheres of government. 
This prevents the usurpation by the central government of the regions’ powers. As 
Anstey Wynes explained,4  
                                                 
2  A Heywood, Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd ed, 2002) 161. 
3  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (Macmillan, 1915) 83. 
4  W A Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (Law Book Co, 1955) 3. 
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The division of powers between the Federal and State Governments being of the 
essence of federalism, it follows that the Constitution of the Federal State must 
almost necessarily be of the written and rigid, or controlled type. For, in order 
that the terms of the union may be adequately and permanently defined, the 
manner of apportionment of powers must be reduced to some definite and 
tangible form, not alterable by the central authority at will. 
Federal systems also require an arbiter to decide over disputes between governments. 
As the power of the Federal State is constitutionally divided between the centre and 
the regions, disputes may arise as to the proper sphere of power to be exercised. So 
the protection of the federal system is vested in the hands of an independent and 
impartial arbiter. Without this the constitutional distribution of powers becomes a 
dead letter.5 As John Stuart Mill pointed out:6 
Under the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each 
particular State owes obedience to two Governments, that of his own state and 
that of the federation, it is evidently necessary not only that the constitutional 
limits of the authority of each should be precisely and clearly defined, but that 
the power to decide between them in any case of dispute should not reside in 
either of the Governments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire 
independent of both. There must be a Supreme Court of Justice, and a system of 
subordinate Courts in every State of the Union, before whom such questions 
shall be carried, and whose judgment on them, in the last stage of appeal, shall 
be final. This involves the remarkable consequence… that a Court of Justice, 
the highest federal tribunal, is supreme over the various Governments, both 
State and Federal; having the right to declare that any law made, or act done by 
them, exceeds the powers assigned to them by the Federal Constitution, and, in 
consequence, has no legal validity. 
Finally, a federation involves linking institutions between each sphere, usually in the 
form of a bicameral legislature. In theory, the regions or states are represented in an 
upper house called the Senate whereby the representatives of each State must defend 
the regional interests. However, the reality is that in places like Australia and the 
United States the Senate has been divided along party lines in the same way as the 
lower house, or House of Representatives, thus not truly protecting the interests of the 
                                                 
5  See A Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835), Chapter VIII.  
6  J S Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Chapter 17.  
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particular States. To be fair, the whole question of what it would mean for the Senate 
to represent States’ interests was discussed at length by the framers of the Australian 
Constitution. The discussions of the composition of the Senate absorbed a substantial 
proportion of the debates in both 1891 and 1897-8. As Aroney points out, some of the 
framers, notably Downer and Hackett, ‘seemed to suggest that a successful Senate 
would be marked by a sense of unity and national purpose. Senators from particular 
states need not always or even usually vote in blocs. They would, instead, be involved 
individually in national policy debate, and might even be aligned with political 
parties’.7    
3. Disadvantages of Federalism 
The Business Council of Australia argues that many of the advantages of federalism 
are theoretical and seldom realised in practice. This is primarily due to the alleged 
difficulty in coordinating the interests and requirements of the different ties of 
government.8 Federalism by its very nature involves two levels of government. This 
can be particularly onerous for businesses that operate across State borders, because 
there might be a great degree of overlap in some areas causing a duplication of 
services.9  
Centralists, or those who favour a powerful central government, therefore accuse 
federalism of being ‘messy and costly’.10 They argue that State governments are 
expansive and wasteful, and that Australia is currently over-governed. Greenwood, a 
critic of federalism, questions the sense of maintaining a federal government, six State 
governments and two territories for a nation of twenty million people.11  
Multiple jurisdictions mean multiple laws and regulations. Centralists thus contend 
that the complex nature of a federal system can lead to uncertainty as to which level 
                                                 
7   N Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the 
Australian Constitution  (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 199. 
8   Business Council of Australia, ‘Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal-
State Relations (October 2006), 5. 
9  For example, businesses that have operations throughout the country such as transport industries 
currently must comply with eight different occupational health and safety regimes.    
10  G Craven, ‘The New Centralism and the Collapse of the Conservative Constitution’, paper 
presented to Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 
2005, 138.  
11  G Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism: A Commentary on the Working of the 
Constitution (University of Queensland Press, 1976) 
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of government is responsible for particular decisions or services. Naturally, there is 
little doubt that uncertainty reduces accountability and ‘leads to buck-passing and 
finger-pointing between governments as they seek to avoid responsibility’.12 This is 
particularly true for a federal system in which the Commonwealth’s powers under s 
51 of the Constitution are shared with the States. Such constitutional arrangement 
naturally creates duplication because both Commonwealth and State government 
often legislate on the same issue. 
Centralists also argue that federalism has become redundant because the original 
hurdles to central national government, such as communication and transport have 
diminished significantly since Federation. Moreover, critics of federalism argue that it 
leads to parochialism in governments and that it has ‘produced social inequality and 
economic injustice’.13 Guy, for example, believes that any improvement to the rights 
of indigenous Australians in the 1990s was due mostly to the Commonwealth, not the 
States.  
On the other hand, although some of the above disadvantages have certainly been 
evident in Australia, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that federalism 
should be abolished; quite to the contrary. Indeed, many of the perceived 
disadvantages of Australia’s federalism could stem, among other things, from the 
High Court’s expansive reading of Commonwealth power. As for duplication this is 
rather a problem with management, and not an inherent problem with federalism. As 
Twomey and Writhers point out,14   
[I]f a federal system is well structured and well managed, the amount of 
duplication may be minimised. Much of the duplication in Australia 
arises because the Commonwealth funds and attempts to micro-manage 
State programs though specific purpose payments. This means that the 
Commonwealth creates its own bodies to set conditions and monitor their 
implementation, duplicating State bodies. It also means that the States are 
required to undertake unnecessary administration in justifying the use of 
                                                 
12  Business Council of Australia, above n 8, 6.  
13  S Guy, ‘Overcoming the Institutional and Constitutional Constraints of Australian Federalism: 
Developing a New Social Democratic Approach to the Federal Framework’ (2006) 34 Federal Law 
Review 319, 328. 
14  A Twomey and G Withers, Australia’s Federal Future: Delivering Growth and Prosperity 
(Federalist Paper I) (April 2007), 22. 
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Commonwealth funds. The duplication and waste involved here is not 
inherent to federalism. It could be avoided if there were a better 
allocation of responsibilities and financial resources between the 
Commonwealth and the States, with each managing and funding its own 
responsibilities.     
4. Advantages of Federalism 
The initial question that must be asked before considering the key issues and priorities 
for the reform of the Australian Federation is whether Australia’s basic governmental 
structure should continue to be a Federal Commonwealth?  Does federalism still have 
a place in 21st century Australia?  Is there any value in recognising federalism as one 
of our guiding constitutional principles?  In our view, the answer to these questions 
must be a resounding and unequivocal yes. 
Twomey and Withers have previously noted the somewhat unusual disconnect 
between current Australian attitudes towards federalism and the prevailing attitude in 
the rest of the world.  The modern international trend is strongly towards federalism 
and decentralized government.  As Twomey and Withers stated:15 
In Australia, it is often asserted that federalism is an old-fashioned, 
cumbersome and inefficient system.  Yet internationally, federalism is 
regarded as a modern, flexible and efficient structure that is ideal for 
meeting the needs of local communities while responding to the 
pressures of globalization.  The difference between these two views is 
stark. 
Beyond the simple reality that there would be enormous practical difficulties 
associated with attempting to govern a country the size of Australia with a single, 
centralized government, there are numerous other advantages apparent in a federal 
system.  A direct comparison of federal and unitary governments suggests that federal 
arrangements tend to produce more stable governments, more efficient governments, 
higher rates of economic growth, and greater integrity in government.16  If we were to 
look at quantifying this benefit, it has been suggested that ‘... the specific advantage 
                                                 
15  Twomey and Withers, above n 14, 2. 
16  Ibid, 8. 
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achieved by Australia through the federal structure itself is a sum of $4,507 per capita 
in 2006 – or $11,402 per average household’.17 Twomey and Withers go on to suggest 
that the ‘federalism dividend’ may be increased by further reform of the Australian 
Federation.18 
Twomey and Withers conclude that federalism is the right political structure for 
Australia.  A well-designed federal system has a number of advantages over a unitary 
system of government.  The broad sweep of advantages can be categorised into three 
key areas: the plurality achieved through increased participation and access to the 
political system; regional autonomy and diversity; and innovation and competitive 
efficiencies.19  Geoffrey Walker writes:20 
An awareness of the positive benefits of federalism will make the constitutional 
debate a more equal and fruitful one.  This will mean recognizing that, in a 
properly working federation, government is more adaptable to the preferences 
of the people, more open to experiment and its rational evaluation, more 
resistant to shock and misadventure, and more stable.  Its decentralized, 
participatory structure is a buttress of liberty and a counterweight to elitism.  It 
fosters the traditionally Australian, but currently atrophying, qualities of 
responsibility and self-reliance.  Through greater ease of monitoring and the 
action of competition, it makes government less of a burden on the people.  It is 
desirable in a small country and indispensable in a large one.  And if, as is often 
said, the pursuit of truth in freedom is the essence of civilization, this ‘liberating 
and positive form of organization’ has a special contribution to make to the 
progress of humankind. 
Galligan and Walsh assert that this enhancement of democratic participation through 
dual citizenship and multiple governments is undoubtedly federalism’s most positive 
quality.  According to them, this largely explains its strength and resilience in 
Australia.21  Federalism preserves the States as small democratic polities, enabling the 
national strength of a large nation to be added to the enhanced participatory qualities 
                                                 
17  Ibid, 41. 
18  Ibid, 41. 
19   Heywood, above n 2, 10. 
20  G de Walker, above n 8. 
21  B Galligan and C Walsh, ‘Australian Federalism: Yes or No?’, in G Craven (ed), Australian 
Federation (Melbourne University Press, 1992) 195. 
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of small democratic states.22  Related to the idea of the democratic process, a further 
strength of federalism is its capacity to secure regional autonomy and to accommodate 
and reconcile competing diversities between and within States.  According to Hans 
Kelsen:23  
Democracy … may be centralized as well as decentralized in a static sense; but 
decentralisation allows a closer approach to the idea of democracy than 
centralization.  This idea is the principle of self-determination… Conformity to 
the order with the will of the majority is the aim of democratic organization.  
But the central norms of the order, valid of the whole territory, may easily come 
into contradiction with the majority will of a group living on a partial territory.  
The fact that the majority of the total community belongs to a certain political 
party, nationality, race, language, or religion, does not exclude the possibility 
that within certain partial territories the majority of individuals belong to 
another party, nationality, race, language, or religion.  The majority of the entire 
nation may be socialistic or Catholic, the majority of one or more provinces 
may be liberal or Protestant.  In order to diminish the possible contradiction 
between the contents of the legal order and the will of the individuals subject to 
it, in order to approximate as far as possible the ideal of democracy, it may be 
necessary, under certain circumstances, that certain noms of the legal order be 
valid only for certain partial territories and be created only by majority of votes 
of the individuals living in these territories. Under the condition that the 
population of the State has no uniform social structure, territorial division of the 
State territory into more or less autonomous provinces … may be a democratic 
postulate. 
                                                 
22  Ibid, 195.  The idea comes from Book IX of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1789): ‘If a 
republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal 
imperfection … It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at length, obliged to 
live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not conrtrived a kind of 
constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a 
monarchical, government.  I mean a confederate republic.  This form of government is a convention 
by which several petty states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to 
establish.  It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by 
means of further associations, till they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for 
the security of the whole body’. Montesquieu’s analysis of the federal republic was discussed by 
Australian framers such as Thomas Just, who even wrote ‘one of the most important studies of 
federalism’ specifically for the federal convention of 1891. As Aroney points out, Just’s Leading 
Facts connected with Federalism (1891) sought to introduce the Australian readers not only to the 
views of Montesquieu but also to those of Hamilton, Jay and Madison, and ‘sought to show how 
their perspectives could be applied to Australian conditions’. – Aroney, above n…, 105. 
23  H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Russell & Russell, 1945), 313. 
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The enhancement of democratic participation in a federal system arises from 
the ordinary citizen being given multiple points of access to the government 
and through greater choice and diversity being provided.  A federal system 
allows for greater flexibility in policy choices, with the different needs of 
citizens in different parts of the country able to be met through the 
customisation of policies at the sub-national level.  For a country such as 
Australia the benefits of this are obvious.  The needs and issues of somebody 
living in Coober Pedy will not be the same as those of somebody living in 
Coogee, and it simply isn’t realistic to expect a bureaucrat in Canberra to be 
responsive to these differing local concerns. A federal system strengthens 
participatory democracy by bringing government closer to the people, allowing 
local people to have a greater say in the local decisions that directly affect 
them. 
Related to this discussion is also the assumption that federalism protects individuals 
because it prevents an excessive accumulation of power in either level of government.  
Sir Harry Gibbs once remarked that the most effective way to curb political power 
was to divide it.24  This argument that federalism can better secure human rights and 
freedoms was supported by Sir Robert Menzies, who once declared that ‘in the 
division of power, in the demarcation of powers between a Central Government and 
the State Government there resides one of the true protections of individual 
freedom’.25  A similar point was made by James Madison in Federalist No. 51:26 
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the 
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against 
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.  In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first 
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the people.  The different governments will control each 
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. 
                                                 
24  H Gibbs, ‘Courage in Constitutional Interpretation and its Consequences: One Example’ (1991) 14 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 325. 
25  R Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth (Cassell, 1967) 24. 
26  J Madison, The Federalist No. 51 (6 February 1788). 
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The idea that federalism enhances personal freedom has been bolstered under 
contemporary ‘public choice’ theories by notions of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’.27  According 
to American federal Judge Robert Bork, the federal system enhances personal 
autonomy because ‘if another state allows the liberty you value, you can move there, 
and the choice of what freedom you value is yours alone, not dependent on those who 
made the Constitution.  In this sense, federalism is the constitutional guarantee most 
protective of the individual’s freedom to make his own choices’.28  A similar point is 
made by Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court:29 
Now there are many reasons for having a federal system, but surely the most 
important is that it produces more citizens content with the laws under which they 
live.  If, for example, the question of permitting so-called ‘sexually oriented 
businesses’ – porn shops – were put to a nationwide referendum, the outcome 
might well be 51 per cent to 49 per cent, one way or the other.  If that result were 
imposed nationwide, nearly half of the population would be living under a regime 
it disapproved.  But such a huge proportion of the pro-sex-shop vote would be in 
states such as New York, California, and Nevada; and a huge proportion of the 
anti-sex-shop vote would be in the south, and in such western states as Utah and 
New Mexico.  If the question of permitting sexually oriented businesses were left 
to the states – which is surely where the First Amendment originally left it – 
perhaps as much as 80 per cent of the population would be living under a regime 
that it approved.  Running a federal system is a lot of trouble; a large proportion 
of the time of my Court is spent sorting out federal-state relations.  It is quite 
absurd to throw away the principal benefit of that system by constitutionalizing, 
and hence federalizing, all sorts of dispositions never addressed by the text of the 
Constitution. 
The competitive nature of a federal system is a further benefit, promoting efficiency, 
innovation and responsiveness.  Competition between State and Federal governments 
should (theoretically) encourage an overall improvement in government performance.  
Policy innovations can be tested on a smaller scale and, if these experiments fail, 
                                                 
27  See: G Brennan and J M Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundation of a Fiscal 
Constitution  (Cambridge University Press, 1980). See also: J Gillespie, ‘New Federalisms’. in J 
Brett, J Gillespie and M Goot (eds),  Developments in Australian Politics (MacMillan, 1994) 69-71.  
28  R Bork, The Tempting of America (Simon & Schuster, 1991) 53. 
29  A Scalia, ‘Romancing the Constitution: Interpretation as Invention’. in G Huscroft and I Brodie 
(eds), Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (LexisNexis, 2004) 342. 
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federalism ‘cushions the nation as a whole from the full impact of government 
blunders’.30   
The cooperation that is inevitably required between different levels of government in 
a federation should also result in better decision-making by building a heightened 
level of debate and scrutiny into the system.  This point has previously been 
emphasised by Twomey and Withers:31 
The involvement of more than one government means that a proposal will 
receive a great deal more scrutiny than if it were the work of one government 
alone.  Problems with implementing the proposal in different parts of the 
country are more likely to be identified, where there is conflict between 
governments on the nature and detail of the proposal, there is more likely to be a 
public debate as different governments are forced to put their positions and 
justify them in the public domain.  While this has the disadvantage of 
sometimes slowing down reform, the need for cooperation has the 
corresponding advantage of ensuring that reform, when implemented, is better 
considered and more moderate in its nature. 
Of course, a federal system is not without its disadvantages also.  The most common 
arguments against federalism are that it is inefficient, expensive, and leads to wasteful 
duplication and excessive bureaucracy; that it reduces accountability by encouraging 
‘conflict and buck-passing’;32 and that it is incompatible with the needs of a modern 
economy.  The first point to note in response to these criticisms is that some of the 
largest and most internationally competitive economies in the world are federations.  
A federal system is clearly not itself an impediment to economic success in a 
globalised world, or to the delivery of competitive and efficient services.  Indeed, 
recent attempts at service delivery at the Commonwealth level reinforce the point that 
centralized administration does not automatically lead to greater efficiencies, reduced 
costs, or better outcomes.  The second point is that many of the above criticisms are 
not criticisms of federalism per se, but of the way that federalism operates in 
                                                 
30  G de Q Walker, ‘Ten Advantages of a Federal Constitution and How to Make the Most of Them’, 
The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, 04 April 2001, 31. 
<www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-49.pdf>, at 29 April 2011. 
31  Twomey and Withers, above n 14, 15. 
32  Ibid, 24. 
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Australia.  Reforms to the federal system may well help to address some of these 
criticisms and produce a more effective federal system.   
It is also necessary to keep in mind the advantages previously discussed when 
weighing the costs allegedly associated with federalism.  As noted by Greg Craven:33 
A plausible response is that if federalism is complex, expensive and 
difficult, so is democracy.  In both cases, the question is not simply how 
much it costs, but what you get for the money and effort you expend. 
Finally, before we can begin to minimise any examples of duplication and waste in 
our federal system it will be important to clearly identify the cause of these problems.  
In Australia, much of the unnecessary duplication and cost has actually been caused 
by the Commonwealth Government’s expansion of its sphere of influence.  As Craven 
observed:34 
Perhaps the most popular argument of centralism ... is that federalism in 
Australia involves duplication and divided accountability in government.  
There is considerable truth in this argument.  One of its dangers for 
centralisers, however, is that much of the difficulty in this context has 
occurred because the Commonwealth, through use of its financial 
muscle, has invaded State areas, such as education and health.  Confusion 
of accountability and responsibility thus may be sheeted home to 
Commonwealth incursion, not State incompetence.  In these 
circumstances, a reasonable State response might well be that if the 
Commonwealth is prepared to vacate the field and leave the cheque 
behind, the State would be more than happy to eliminate all elements of 
division and overlap. 
The above discussion has been designed to show that there are considerable 
advantages derived from a well-functioning federal system of government.  Given 
this, and in light of our earlier conclusion that the benefits of federalism are not being 
fully realised in Australia at present, it is timely to explore a possible agenda for 
                                                 
33  G Craven, ‘The New Centralism and the Collapse of the Conservative Constitution’ (Papers on 
Parliament No. 44, Democratic Experiments: Lectures in the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, 
Parliament of Australia, 2004-2005), 138. 
34  Ibid. 
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national reform aimed at strengthening federalism, re-establishing the concept as a 
guiding constitutional value, and restoring the federal balance in Australia. 
5. Australian Federalism: Foundations and Structure 
Australia became a federation when it became also a nation, on 1st January 1901.  The 
country’s federal Constitution was drafted at two Conventions held in the 1890s. 
Some of the key issues during those conventions involved questions of finance and 
trade, and how to conciliate the interests of small States with those of the more 
populous ones. Also relevant was the issue about the preservation of the rights of the 
six existing colonies when they became States of the new federation.35  
The American model was especially attractive to the drafters of the Constitution. 
According to Sir Owen Dixon, they regarded the American system as an 
‘incomparable model’.36 Elaborated in 1891 by Andrew Inglis Clark, a Tasmanian 
jurist who greatly admired the United States, the first draft followed quite closely the 
American model. The general structure of that first draft continued into the 
Constitution’s final version which came into force in 1901.37 
The drafters of the Constitution favoured the federal system due to its recognised 
advantages of being able to promote democracy, protect the rights and liberties of 
citizen, and to prevent the concentration of power.38 They drew much of their 
inspiration from the works of A.V. Dicey and James Bryce. Lord Bryce was so 
influential that the inspiration for the official name of the nation, the Commonwealth 
of Australia, is said to derive from his classic The American Commonwealth.39 The 
drafters often quoted from him to explain things such as why the new federation 
should follow the American model of state rights and judicial review of legislation.    
5.1. Federal Distribution of Powers  
                                                 
35  The drafters of the Australian Constitution created federalism by dividing power solely between the 
Commonwealth and the States. Although Australia has municipal powers such powers are not 
mentioned in the Federal Constitution. Local councils therefore exist only so long they are 
maintained by the States which create them. 
36  O Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 597. 
37  N Aroney, ‘Federalism and the Formation of the Australian Constitution’, in Democracy  
Down Under: Understanding our Constitution (PCV, 1997) 17. 
38  Walker, above n 8. 
39  See: J A La Nauze, ‘The Name of the Commonwealth of Australia’ (1972) 15 Historical Studies 59, 
59-71. See also: Helen Irving, To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia’s 
Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 76-8. 
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The Australian Constitution allocates the areas of legislative power to the 
Commonwealth in ss 51 and 52, with these powers being variously concurrent with 
the States and exclusive. Moreover, the federal Parliament is allowed to make laws 
with respect to ‘matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this 
Constitution in the Parliament’.  
The States were left with everything else. So, although the topics granted to the 
federal legislature are rather significant, ranging from areas such as marriage to 
quarantine and defence, numerous other areas of law, including health, education and 
industrial relations, remained with the States and are not included in the list of federal 
powers. The leading federalist at the first constitutional convention, Sir Samuel 
Griffith, provided the basic reason for such an arrangement, stating in 1891:40  
The separate states are to continue as autonomous bodies, surrendering only so 
much of their powers as is necessary to the establishment of a general 
government to do for them collectively what they cannot do individually for 
themselves, and which they cannot do as a collective body for themselves. 
In fact, Alfred Deakin, also a leading figure of the Australiasian Federation 
Conference of 1890, was convinced that the Constitution would succeed in protecting 
the independence of the States, asserting that:41 
… so far from our Federal Government over-awing the States, it is more 
probable that the States will over-awe the Federal Government. 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Australian Constitution is its 
express limitation on federal legislative powers. Whereas the legislative power of the 
central government is limited to the express provisions of the Constitution, all the 
remaining residue is left undefined to the Australian States.42 The drafters of the 
Constitution thus wished to reserve to the people of each State the right to decide by 
themselves on the most relevant issues through their own state legislatures. In a late 
edition of Introduction to the Study of the Constitution, Dicey reveals why one of the 
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main goals of the framers was to establish a considerably decentralised federal 
system:43    
The Commonwealth is in the strictest sense a federal government. It owes its 
birth to the desire for national unity… combined with the determination on the 
part of the several colonies to retain as States of the Commonwealth as large a 
measure of independence as may be found compatible with the recognition of 
Australian nationality. The creation of a true federal government has been 
achieved mainly by following, without however copying in any servile spirit, 
the fundamental principles of American federalism. As in the United States so 
in the Australian Commonwealth the Constitution… fixes and limits the spheres 
of the federal or national government and of the States respectively, and 
moreover defines these spheres in accordance with the principle that, while the 
powers of the national or federal government, including in the term government 
both the Executive and the Parliament, are, though wide, definite and limited, 
the powers of the separate States are indefinite, so that any power not assigned 
by the Constitution to the federal government remains vested in each of the 
several States, or, more accurately, in the Parliament of each State. In this 
point… the States… retain a large amount of legislative independence. Neither 
the Executive nor the Parliament of the Commonwealth can either directly or 
indirectly veto the legislation, e.g., of the Victorian Parliament. The founders, 
then, of the Commonwealth have, guided in the main by the example of the 
United States, created a true federal government.       
5.2. Inconsistency 
According to s 109 of the Australian Constitution, ‘When a law of a State is 
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid’. Of course, it is only a valid 
federal law which prevails over the State law. If a federal law goes outside its proper 
limits the matter is simply of invalidity of the federal law as is the case of any 
violations to the distribution of powers established by the Constitution.   
The most accepted view about inconsistency is that a State law is not so much 
‘invalid’ because the State Parliament could not pass it. Rather, the matter lies on the 
fact that the State law, though it was enacted with full validity by the State 
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Parliament, is deemed inconsistent with a federal law and so it ceases to operate. But 
if the overriding federal law ceases to operate, the inconsistent State law which was 
lying down dormant is reactivated. As explained by Latham CJ in Carter v Egg Pulp 
Marketing Board (Vic):44 
[Section 109] applies only in cases where, apart from the operation of the 
section, both the Commonwealth and the State laws which are in question 
would be valid. If either is invalid ab initio by reason of lack of power, no 
question can arise under the section. The word ‘invalid’ in this section cannot be 
interpreted as meaning that a State law which is affected by the section becomes 
ultra vires in whole or in part. If the Commonwealth law were repealed, the 
state would again become operative… Thus the world ‘invalid’ should be 
interpreted as meaning ‘inoperative’. This is, I think, made clear by the 
provision that the Commonwealth law ‘shall prevail’ – that is, the 
Commonwealth law has authority and takes effect to the exclusion of the 
inconsistent State law.  
Several are the occasions on which a conflict between a federal law and a State law 
may occur. Inconsistency arises whenever a State law cannot be obeyed at the same 
time as a Commonwealth law.45 Inconsistency also arises if a federal law allows 
something that a State law prohibits;46 or when a federal law confers some right or 
immunity that a State law seeks to remove.47 In addition, inconsistency may arise 
after the controversial ‘cover the field’ test is applied. When the federal government, 
either expressly or impliedly, evinces the intention to ‘cover the field’, it is then 
imputed that only its laws must be applicable.  
Nowhere found in the text of the Constitution, the ‘cover the field’ principle was 
created by Isaacs J in Clyde Enginnering Co Ltd v Cowburn, in 1926. There Isaacs J 
argued that ‘if a competent legislature expressly or impliedly evinces its intention to 
cover the whole filed that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another 
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legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field’.48 The test was later 
explained by Dixon J as it follows49:  
When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each 
legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, 
they make laws which are inconsistent… But the reason is that, by prescribing 
the rule to be observed, the Federal statute shows an intention to cover the 
subject matter and provide what the law upon it shall be. If it appeared that the 
Federal law was intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon State law, 
then no inconsistency would be exhibited in imposing the same duties or in 
inflicting different penalties. The inconsistency does not lie in the mere 
existence of two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience. It 
depends upon the intention of the paramount legislature to express by its 
enactment, completely, exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law 
governing the particular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed. 
When a Federal statute discloses such intention, it is inconsistent with it for the 
law of a State to govern the same conduct or matter.  
Conceived by Isaacs J and endorsed by the High Court in numerous subsequent cases, 
the ‘cover the field’ test has been instrumental for the expansion of federal powers at 
the expense of the powers originally conferred to the States. According to Gibbs, the 
full adoption of the ‘cover the field’ test ‘no doubt indicates that the Courts have 
favoured a centralist point of view rather than a federal one’.50 
6. High Court on Federalism 
Every federation requires a neutral power to determine whether either level of 
government – federal or state – has exceeded the constitutional limits of its respective 
legislative, executive or judicial powers. When Deakin introduced the Judiciary Bill 
into Federal Parliament, he made it very clear that the Australian courts were in 
charge of making sure that that the federal nature of the Commonwealth Constitution 
would be faithfully preserved. He called the High Court the ‘keystone of the federal 
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arch’.51 As such, Dicey wrote its court members are ‘intended to be the interpreters, 
and in this sense the protectors of the Constitution. They are in no way bound… to 
assume the constitutionality of laws passed by the federal legislature’. 52   
During its two first decades of existence the High Court interpreted the 
Commonwealth Constitution in the way it was designed. First appointed in October 
1903, the court originally consisted of only three judges: Chief Justice Samuel 
Griffith and Justices Edmund Barton and Richard O’Connor. Griffith had been the 
main leader of the Convention of 1891; Barton had been the leader of the Convention 
of 1897-8; and O’Connor was one of Barton’s closest associates during that 
convention. Indeed, as Aroney points out, ‘no one could have better understood the 
process by which the Constitution had been brought into being, the animating ideas 
and the pattern of debate than these three judges’.53  
Those first members of the High Court faithfully sought to protect the federal 
structure of the Constitution in the way it was designed. To that goal they borrowed 
from the United States the doctrine of States’ ‘reserved powers’ so as to ensure ‘that 
the residual legislative powers of the states… were not diminished through an 
expansive reading of the Commonwealth’s legislative powers’.54 So when a 
legislative power was found to belong to the States, they should be entitled to the 
same level of independence in its exercise as is the central government in wielding its 
own authority. The ‘reserved powers’ doctrine thus dictates that each level of 
government must possess its own sphere of legislative autonomy. This entitlement to 
legislative independence is declared a State right. After all, as the nineteenth-
century’s US constitutionalist Thomas M. Cooley commented:55 
State rights consist of those rights which belonged to the States when the 
Constitution was formed, and have not by that instrument been granted to the 
Federal government, or prohibited to the States. They are maintained by 
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limiting the exercise of federal power to the sphere which the Constitution 
expressly or by fair implication assigns to it. 
That was the position adopted by the High Court in its early years of existence. The 
first members of the High Court considered the ‘reserved powers’ to directly derive 
from s 107 of the Constitution. This section informs that ‘every power of the 
Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by 
this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or 
withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the 
Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment or the State, as the case may 
be’. Hence, any grant of power which is not explicitly given by the federal 
constitution to the central government must be interpreted as legislative powers 
‘continuing’ with the States. The intrinsic correlation between ‘reserved powers’ and s 
107 was clarified by the High Court in R v Barger:56 
The scheme of the Australian Constitution, like that of the United States of 
America, is to confer certain definite powers upon the Commonwealth, and to 
reserve to the States, whose powers before the establishment of the 
Commonwealth were plenary, all powers no expressly conferred upon the 
Commonwealth. This is expressed by sec.107 of the Constitution.  
A second doctrine adopted by the early Court to protect federalism is called ‘implied 
immunity of instrumentalities’. Overall, this doctrine ensures that neither the 
Commonwealth nor the States are allowed to control each other. Instead, both of them 
must be generally immune from each other’s laws and regulations, so that their 
‘instrumentalities’ (agencies) may be protected from any external encroachment. 
After all, if federalism implies that each tier of government enjoys a certain degree of 
independence in its own spheres of power, then none of them must be allowed to tell 
another what it might or might not do.   
These two basic doctrines began to be eroded when Isaac Isaacs and Henry Higgins 
were appointed to the High Court in 1906. These judges were politically inclined to 
expand Commonwealth powers and from the beginning they adopted a highly 
centralist reading of the Constitution. Isaacs and Higgins JJ had participated at both 
the 1891 and 1897-8 conventions. However, they were in the minority most of the 
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time and had no formal role in the drafting of the Constitution.57 Indeed, as Walter 
Sofronoff points out, Isaacs’s ideas were so unpopular amongst his peers, ‘that despite 
his acknowledged skill and talent, he was excluded from the drafting committee 
which settled the final draft of the Constitution for consideration by the 
Conventions’.58  
 
There is a good reason, therefore, to question the reliability of their views concerning 
the underlying ideas and general objectives of Federation.59 Even so, in the 
Engineers’ Case, in 1920, Isaacs J successfully introduced a new method of 
interpretation whereby no areas of law are assumed to be reserved to the States.60 
Under Isaacs J’s leadership the ‘implied immunity of instrumentalities’ and the 
‘reserved powers’ doctrine were overturned on the grounds that s 107 is simply about 
continuing State powers that are exclusive, or which are protected by express 
reservation in the Constitution.  
 
This is a gross misreading of s 107, which refers only to legislative powers that are 
not exclusively granted to the federal government. Section 107, therefore, actually 
confirms that State parliaments must continue to exercise full legislative powers, 
except for those that are given exclusively to the Commonwealth at Federation. So 
when it comes to the configuration of legislative power between the Commonwealth 
and the States, writes Aroney, the framers of the Australian Constitution saw the 
States as ‘possessing original powers of local self-government, which they 
specifically insisted would continue under the Constitution, subject only to the 
carefully defined and limited powers specifically conferred upon the 
Commonwealth’.61 And yet, since the Engineers’ Case, Walker explains:62     
The reserved powers approach has been called unsupportable because s.107 
does not, unlike the Tenth Amendment [to the US Constitution], use the word 
"reserved". That is just an insubstantial matter of labelling. As s.107 says State 
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powers "shall ... continue", the Court could just as easily have called it the 
"continuing powers" approach. If anything, s.107 is more forcefully expressed, 
as it saves "every" power and excepts only those powers "exclusively" vested in 
the Commonwealth, words of emphasis that do not appear in the American 
model. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland pointed out that the 
word "expressly [delegated to the central government]" used in the 1781 
Articles of Confederation was dropped from the Constitution, probably 
deliberately.  Griffith remarked on this in D'Emden v. Pedder, pointing out that 
s.107 was more definite than the Tenth Amendment. 
The main problem with the majority decision in Engineers’ was the refusal to 
interpret the Commonwealth Constitution as a federal document. The court opted 
instead to interpret this merely as an Act of the Imperial Parliament (UK), meaning 
that any grant of federal power should be interpreted as expansively as possible. As 
early as 1906, in The Railway Servants’ Case,63 Isaacs, in his capacity of 
Commonwealth Attorney-General, could already be found advocating the same 
interpretative approach that as a Justice he would apply in 1920. Back in 1906 Issacs 
submitted:64 
The Constitution must be dealt with in the same way as any other Imperial Act 
of Parliament. No prohibitions are to be implied in it… The Australian 
Constitution is a grant and distribution of powers by the Imperial Parliament. 
The Constitutions of the States now depend on the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth.  
Although justifiable by the fact that the Australian Constitution in its form was a 
statute of the Imperial Parliament, such an argument ‘completely overlooks the 
federal basis and structure of the Constitution as a whole’.65 Since the drafters of the 
Constitution opted for defining only the federal powers specifically, and they 
explicitly informed that all the existing powers of the States must continue, there is an 
obvious reason to assume that the preservation of State powers in s 107 is logically 
prior to the conferral of federal power in s 51. According to Aroney, ‘such scheme 
suggests that there is good reason to bear in mind what is not conferred on the 
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Commonwealth by s.51 when determining the scope of what is conferred. There is, 
therefore, good reason to be hesitant before interpreting federal heads of power as 
fully and completely as their literal words can allow’.66 In sum, as Aroney points 
out,67  
… the configuration of legislative power in the Constitution reflected not so 
much a … ‘division of powers’ between the Commonwealth and the states, but 
a transfer of limited powers to the Commonwealth by the states. This is not to 
deny the undoubted fact that the Australian Constitution would derive its legal 
force from its enactment by the imperial Parliament of Westminster, so that, 
legally speaking, the powers were ultimately derived from the United Kingdom 
and ‘divided’ among them in this sense. But it is to assert that the structural 
logic of the Constitution was shaped not by the legally defined origin of the 
Constitution, but by its political origin: the peoples, the representative 
legislatures and the elected government of the several colonies. The political 
origin of the Constitution meant that legislative power was conceived as 
originating with the states, with limited and mostly overlapping or concurrent 
powers being conferred upon the Commonwealth.  
Fortunately, even after Engineers’ the High Court has declared that there are certain 
things that the central government is not allowed to do. In Melbourne Corporation a 
federal law was declared invalid if it either discriminates against a State or if it 
impinges on the capacity of States to exist as ‘independent entities’.68 In practice, 
however, this principle has done little to restrict the expansion of Commowealth 
power, because it is not uncommon for the Court to recognise the principle but then 
suggest that it has not been breached in the particular case. Cheryl Saunders is one 
academic who has questioned the effectiveness of the Melbourne Corporation 
principle, asking:69 
What is the utility of a principle which protects the formal existence of the 
States in a federation, or that nebulous concept of their capacity to function, 
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while enabling them to be deprived of an unlimited and unpredicted range of 
functions or the revenue resources to meet those functions? 
Indeed, the fundamental problem of (unconstitutional) centralisation has not been 
altered, among other things because the general method of interpretation espoused by 
Isaacs has prevailed as the method most frequently adopted by the High Court, so that 
the supremacy of the Commonwealth has been judicially assured.70  
6.1. External Affairs and the Constitution  
A significant example of the High Court’s centralist approach is observable in the 
interpretation given to s 51(xxix) of the Constitution, which says: ‘The Parliament 
shall, subject to this Constitution, have the power to make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to … external affairs’.  
The Federal Executive has entered into over a thousand treaties on a wide range of 
matters.71 Numerous of these international agreements are related to topics not 
otherwise covered by the enumerated powers of the Constitution. In R v Burgess; Ex 
parte Henry (1936), the majority (Latham CJ, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) held that this 
section should not be restricted to a power to make laws with respect to the external 
aspects of the other subjects mentioned in s 51. For Latham CJ, it would be 
‘impossible to say a priori that any subject is necessarily such that it could never 
properly be dealt with by international agreement’.72  
In his dissenting judgment, Starke J argued that the external affairs power should be 
limited to situations where the subject of the treaty is ‘of sufficient international 
significance to make it a legitimate subject for international co-operation and 
agreement’.73 Similarly, Dixon J dissented in these terms:74 
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It seems an extreme view that merely because the Executive Government 
undertakes with some other country that the conduct of persons in Australia 
shall be regulated in a particular way, the legislature thereby obtains a power to 
enact that regulation although it relates to a matter of internal concern which, 
apart from the obligation undertaken by the Executive, could not be considered 
as a matter of external affairs.  
There is a wide range of international treaties and conventions which can be used to 
underpin federal legislation. The Commonwealth can undermine federalism just by 
making a greater use of the external affairs power, without having to rely on any co-
operation by the States. Indeed, Gibbs once argued that, together with the regular 
operation of s109 (inconsistency) of the Constitution, the external affairs power has 
the potential to ‘annihilate State legislative power in virtually every respect’.75 In the 
Tasmania Dam Case, Gibbs in addition declared:76  
The division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States which the 
Constitution effects could be rendered quite meaningless if the federal 
government could, by entering into treaties with foreign governments on 
matters of domestic concern, enlarge the legislative powers of the 
[Commonwealth] Parliament so that they embraced literally all fields of activity 
… Section 51 (xxix) should be given a construction that will, so far as possible, 
avoid the consequence that the federal balance of the Constitution can be 
destroyed at the will of the Executive.  
The above concerns have not been accommodated. Rather, the High Court has given 
the power to the Commonwealth to legislate on any area of law covered by a bona 
fide international instrument. Thus what the federal Parliament could not do under the 
Australian Constitution it can now do by virtue of any treaty obligation. As a result, 
the central government can increase legislative power simply by agreeing to ratify 
such treaties.77 This possibility was recognised by Dawson J, who saw a broad 
interpretation of the external affairs power as having ‘the capacity to obliterate the 
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division of power which is a necessary feature of any federal system and our federal 
system in particular’.78 
6.2. Industrial Relations and the Constitution 
For a long time it was argued that the Commonwealth’s power over industrial 
relations was restricted only to conciliation and arbitration. After all, s 51 (xxxv) of 
the Constitution gives the Commonwealth a very limited power over the subject of 
industrial relations. Under this paragraph, the federal power to regulate industrial 
relations extends only to matters of ‘conciliation and arbitration’ of industrial disputes 
‘extending beyond the limits of any one State’ to which the grant of power refers. 
The idea that the Commonwealth should have plenary power to legislate with respect 
to industrial disputes was first introduced by South Australian Premier Charles 
Cameron Kingston, in 1891. He contended that the Commonwealth Parliament should 
be able to make laws ‘for the establishment of courts of conciliation and arbitration, 
having jurisdiction throughout the Commonwealth, for the settlement of industrial 
disputes’.79 The reason for this, according to Nicola Petit, is that ‘the strikes of the 
early 1890’s were fresh in the framer’s minds and both the supporters and opposers of 
a federal industrial disputes power saw the industrial conflicts as an ‘evil’ that must be 
avoided’.80  
Although Kingston withdrew his proposal before the delegates could vote on the 
subject, a new proposal was presented by Henry Higgins of Victoria, in 1897. Higgins 
argued that the Commonwealth should have the power to legislate with respect ‘to 
conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
extending beyond the limits of any State’.81 Although these are now the words of s 51 
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(xxxv), this proposal was soundly defeated (22 to 12) because some of the delegates 
were concerned that industrial disputes were essentially local in character.82   
Higgins then put the same proposal again in 1898, and, at this time, the conciliation 
and arbitration power was narrowly adopted 22 to 19. Arguably, the majority of 
delegates who voted for this inclusion did so because they thought that this would not 
be used and so there was no harm in including it. Even so, delegates such as 
McMillan of New South Wales expressed the concern that disputes could actually be 
manufactured in order to come under federal jurisdiction. Overall, writes Louise 
Clegg:83 
There is no doubt that the architects of the Constitution assumed that the States 
would be responsible for the regulation of industrial relations generally. The 
intention was that the Commonwealth should only be permitted to make laws 
supporting the resolution (by conciliation and arbitration) of a small number of 
interstate industrial disputes.  
The worse fears of McMillan were fulfilled in the Builders Labourers Case (1914), 
when the High Court decided to broaden the reach of the industrial disputes by 
declaring that ‘paper disputes’ (i.e., the use of written ‘logs of claims’ served on 
employers) were sufficient to generate an interstate dispute.84 These paper disputes 
enabled many people to come under federal jurisdiction, but the Commonwealth still 
had a limited power to legislate with respect to industrial disputes, because the 
conciliation and arbitration power is a (limited) purposive power that has far more 
limitations than other plenary powers of the Constitution.  
Ten years after Federation, the federal Labor government tried to expand its reach into 
industrial affairs through referendum. The referendum failed as did five others put 
forward by federal Labor governments in 1913, 1919, 1944, 1946 and 1973. The 
Nationalist Party also unsuccessfully put forward a proposal law affecting industry 
and commerce, in 1926.   
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Frustrated by the people’s reluctance to expand the federal power the Commonwealth 
sought a way to overcome the problem by turning to other grants of legislative power. 
As such, other heads of legislative power have been used to expand the 
Commonwealth’s reach over industrial affairs. The industrial relations reforms in the 
1990s saw s 51(xx) - the corporations power – emerging as a major source of power 
to rival the original reliance on the conciliation and arbitration power.85  
6.3. The Work Choices Case 
Section 51(xx) of the Constitution confers power on the federal government to make 
laws with respect to trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth. In 2005 the Commonwealth created a national industrial relations 
system based mainly on s 51(xx) of the Constitution. As a result, all employees 
working at ‘constitutional corporations’ formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth were covered by this industrial relations system 
One of the main arguments against the validity of that system was that the 
corporations power was not the appropriate head of power for regulating industrial 
relations. The appropriate head of power was s 51 (xxxv), which limited the federal 
power to matters of conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State. The Plaintiffs thus 
contended that a wide reading of a head of power should be prevented if there is an 
explicit restriction that is based on the express language of the Constitution.  
In the Work Choices Case a five-to-two majority did not accept that express 
limitation.86 They followed a centralist approach in which so long as a law could be 
characterized as a law with respect to a subject-matter within the legislative power, it 
did not matter that it also affects another subject-matter altogether. As such, a head of 
power does not have to be read narrowly so as to avoid this breaching the explicit 
limitations of another head of power.   
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In this sense, the result in Work Choices represented the continuation of how the High 
Court has approached the Constitution since the Engineers’ Case. It confirms the 
centralist method adopted by members of this Court, which has given the 
Commonwealth the potential to further regulate many areas of law that had so far 
been within State control. 87 In his dissenting judgement Kirby J emphasised the great 
need to adopt a more narrow approach to constitutional interpretation, stating that a 
broad view ‘went a long way to destabilising the federal nature of the Australian 
Constitution’. According to him:88 
In the interpretation of legal words, it is accepted today that serious errors can 
result from focusing on the words alone, in isolation, and omitting the context 
in which those words appear. Paying regard to context is now a settled 
requirement for the construction of statutes. The same is true in ascertaining 
the meaning of a constitutional provision …  
It follows that, to take the language of the corporations power in par (xx) of 
s51 in isolation and to ignore the other paragraphs of that section, would 
involve a serious mistake… Clearly, it was not intended that s 51(xxxv) 
should be otiose, irrelevant or entirely optional to the Commonwealth in its 
application. Nor was it intended that the important restrictions imposed on the 
federal exercise of legislative powers in par (xxxv), with respect to laws on 
industrial disputes, should be set at nought by invoking another head of power, 
such as that contained in par (xx). 
Justice Callinan, who also dissented, argued that the ‘centralizing principles’ 
embraced by the High Court have produced ‘eccentric, unforeseen, improbable and 
unconvincing results’. For him, they would have ‘subvert[ed] the Constitution and the 
                                                 
87  Even so, the majority who decided that case suggested that the outcome could have been slightly 
different had the plaintiffs challenged the Engineers’ case and the centralizing process it has 
undesirably engendered. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ said at 50: ‘No 
party to these proceedings questioned the authority of the Engineers’ Case, or the Concrete Pipes 
Case, or the validity of the Trade Practices Act in its application to the domestic (intra-State) trade 
of constitutional corporations. Necessarily, however, the plaintiffs experienced difficulty in 
accommodating their submissions to those developments. If s 51(xx) is not affected by the 
limitations inherent in s 51(i), why is it affected by the limitations inherent in s 51(xxxv)?’  
88  New South Wales v Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) (2006) 229 CLR 1, 468, 
471, 515. 
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delicate distribution or balancing of powers which it contemplates’. As Callinan J 
points out:89  
There is nothing in the text or the structure of the Constitution to suggest that 
the Commonwealth’s powers should be enlarged, by successive decisions of 
this Court, so that the Parliament of each State is progressively reduced until it 
becomes no more than an impotent debating society. This Court too is a creature 
of the Constitution. Its powers are defined in Ch III, and legislative made under 
it. The Court goes beyond power if it reshapes the federation. By doing that it 
also subverts the sacred and exclusive role of the people to do so under s 128.  
6.4. The Money Problem  
Perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of Australian federalism is its vertical fiscal 
imbalance.90 The drafters of the Constitution wished to secure the States’ financial 
position and independence. And yet, the High Court has allowed for the expansion of 
Commonwealth powers in areas of taxation that were not envisaged by them. As a 
result, the States have become heavily dependent on the Commonwealth for their 
revenue and any semblance of balance has largely disappeared.  
The expansion of federal taxation powers has occurred, among other things, as a 
result of the Commonwealth’s exclusive control over the levying of income tax. At 
Federation, in 1901, only the States levied income tax. By 1942, however, the 
Commonwealth sought to obtain the exclusive control over the income tax system. It 
was argued that the war effort required this to be so. Thus a series of bills were passed 
that: a) prohibited taxpayers from paying State income tax until Commonwealth tax 
had been paid; b) provided that the rate of federal income tax was so high that it 
became politically impossible for the States to levy a concurrent income tax; and c) 
allowed the Commonwealth Parliament to provide for a grant in order to compensate 
the States that refrained from imposing their income taxes.  
In South Australia v Commonwealth (First Uniform Tax Case) (1942), a majority of 
the High Court held that the grants power could be used subject to any conditions the 
                                                 
89  New South Wales v Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) (2006) 229 CLR 1, 779. 
90  B Galligan and C Walsh, ‘Australian Federalism: Developments and Prospects’, (1990) 20 (4) 
Plubius 7. 
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Commonwealth chose to impose.91  When the war was over and the Commonwealth 
continued to monopolise the income tax system, a further challenge was made against 
the statutory regime. In Victoria v Commonwealth (Second Uniform Tax Case),92 the 
High Court confirmed the Commonwealth power to impose whatever conditions it 
saw fit on the grant of money to the States. The majority once again upheld the power 
of the Commonwealth to impose whatever conditions it saw if on the grant of moneys 
to the States.93  
The drafters of the Constitution conferred upon the Commonwealth the power to levy 
customs and excise duties so as to develop a national common market.94  And yet, 
they sought to limit it by specifying that any surplus revenue derived from these two 
federal taxes be apportioned to the States. This was done to prevent any serious 
dislocation to the States’ finances, especially during the transition from colonial to 
Federal government. So a compromise was reached with the draft of ss 87, 89 and 93. 
In brief, any excess revenues should be returned to the States during a specified 
period of time. Once that period expired, s 96 would give power to the 
Commonwealth to grant financial assistance ‘to any State on such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament thinks fit’.  
The High Court has allowed s 96 to be used subject to any conditions the 
Commonwealth chooses to impose.95 As a result, the States are induced to achieve 
objects on behalf of the Commonwealth which the Commonwealth itself could not 
achieve under any of its enumerated powers. These conditions may be directed to any 
area of State law, including education96, health, roads97 and compulsory purchase of 
land.98 Section 96 grants have become, as Sir Robert Menzies put it:99 
                                                 
91  (1942) 65 CLR 373. 
92  (1957) 99 CLR 575. 
93 In the Second Uniform Tax Case the High Court, however, struck down that part of the scheme 
which gave priority to tax due to the Commonwealth, holding that such a law did not fall within 
s 51(ii) or its implied incidental power. This was of very little assistance to the States, because if 
they imposed such tax they would lose their s 96 grants. A statement was also made in this case that 
the imposition of a blanket prohibition on State taxation which relied on s 109 would not lie within 
the Commonwealth’s taxation power under s 51(ii).  
94  Australian Constitution, Section 90. 
95  In South Australia v Commonwealth (First Uniform Tax Case) (1942). 
96  In A-G (Vic); ex rel Black v Commonwealth (DOGS Case) (1981), the High Court held that the 
Commonwealth could grant the States money on condition that the States then paid it to religious 
schools.  
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… a major, and flexible instrument for enlarging the boundaries of 
Commonwealth action; or, to use realistic terms, Commonwealth powers. 
The financial problems of the States have been aggravated by judicial decisions that 
have effectively prevented them from, amongst other things, raising their own income 
taxes.  As a result, the States cannot raise anywhere near the revenue they need. The 
Commonwealth currently collect over 80% of taxation revenue (including the GST), 
but is responsible for 54% of government outlays.  On the other hand, the States 
collect only 16% of taxation revenue and account for around 39% of outlays.100 The 
States thus have turned to new sources of taxation such as gambling, although 
remaining heavily dependent on Commonwealth grants. When the Commonwealth 
grants them money it often does so with strings attached. And yet, as Stewart and 
Williams point out, ‘the States have no real choice but to accept the money, even at 
the cost of doing the Commonwealth’s bidding’.101  
7. A Possible Agenda for National Reform 
The federal system in Australia has been called “dysfunctional” and in need of 
rescue.102  Federalism remains the right political structure for Australia, but it is also 
clear that there are significant challenges facing our federal system and that a process 
of reform offers the opportunity to improve and strengthen the day-to-day operation 
of federalism in Australia. This paper will discuss and recommend a number of 
specific reform proposals in relation to the following areas: 
a) the distribution of constitutional powers and responsibilities; 
b) processes for enhancing cooperation between the various levels of Australian 
government; 
                                                                                                                                            
97  In Victoria v Commonwealth (Federal Roads Case) (1926) 38 CLR 399, the High Court allowed 
the Commonwealth to grant the States money on the condition that it should be used to construct 
roads designated by the Commonwealth, even though road building did not fall within any 
enumerated power. 
98  In Pye v Renshaw (1951) 84 CLR 58 the Court upheld the use by the Commonwealth of s 96 to 
grant money to the States, provided it is used to effect the for returning servicemen at less than its 
value. As a result, the Commonwealth evaded the s.51 (xxxi) requirement that property must be 
acquired on just terms. 
99  Menzies, above n 17, 76. 
100  A Stewart and G Williams, Work Choices: What the Court Said (Federation Press, 2007), 12-13. 
101  Ibid, 13.  
102  See, for example, G Williams, ‘Old flaws in federalism rise again’, The Sydney Morning Herald (12 
April 2005); K Wiltshire, ‘Academic urges Constitutional reform’, UQ News Online (28 February 
2007); M Steketee, ‘Federalism is a dead idea. So what now?’, The Australian (24 April 2010). 
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c) financial relations between Federal and State governments; and 
d) possible constitutional amendments. 
All of the proposed reforms are aimed towards the primary deficiency in Australian 
Federation, namely the need to revitalize federalism by restoring the federal balance, 
so as to ensure that the ‘federalism dividend’ is fully realised for all Australians. 
7.1. The Distribution of Constitutional Powers and Responsibilities. 
The world has changed significantly since the Australian Constitution was drafted 
over one hundred years ago.  While the core constitutional principles and structures 
remain as relevant today as they were at the time of Federation, it is increasingly 
accepted that it would be beneficial to revisit the distribution of constitutional powers 
and responsibilities between levels of government to ensure greater clarity and to 
better reflect modern conditions.  The current Australian Federation is characterised 
by significant areas of shared responsibility, which heightens the opportunity for a 
‘blurring of government responsibilities – from cost and blame-shifting among 
government levels, wasteful duplication of effort or under-provision of services, and a 
lack of effective policy coordination’.103   
It is also important to note that the constitutional allocation of powers envisaged by 
the Founding Fathers – creating a national government with expressly defined and 
limited powers – has, in a number of significant areas, shifted considerably as a result 
of an approach to constitutional interpretation in the High Court that has consistently 
expanded federal powers.  The current constitutional division of powers is, in many 
respects, the worst of both worlds – it neither faithfully reflects the federal design of 
the Founding Fathers, nor has it fully evolved to reflect modern realities and 
challenges. 
It has therefore been suggested that a constitutional convention should be held to 
consider the distribution of constitutional powers and responsibilities in the modern 
context.  Any such reallocation of powers should aim, where possible:104  
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to isolate a particular area of policy and allocate it in its entirety to one 
level of government … This enhances responsibility, provides clarity to 
those who use particular services and avoids the problem of cost-shifting 
and buck-passing. 
The principle of subsidiarity should be applied in this analysis to appropriately reflect 
Australia’s federal nature. It consists in letting people do what they can do by 
themselves and, on a higher level, leaving up to the federal government what cannot 
be done by lesser circles of power. In other words, subsidiarity leaves up to the states 
(and the individual citizens) what they can do by themselves and leaves in the hands 
of the federal government only what cannot be done otherwise.105 This principle 
provides:106 
… that functions should, where practical, be vested in the lowest level of 
government to ensure that their exercise is as close to the people as 
possible and reflects community preferences and local conditions … The 
principle of subsidiarity places the onus on those who seek to place a 
function with a higher level of government to make the case for it. 
That is not to say that there is no role for the national government.  It is recognised 
that certain powers should be vested in the national government, such as where there 
are overriding national interest concerns (such as defence), where national uniformity 
is required for reasons of equity (such as social security benefits), there are significant 
economies of scale available to a national government, or where there are significant 
potential inter-jurisdictional spill-overs if a lower level of government is given 
responsibility.  When we speak of re-strengthening federalism this is not just a blanket 
call to strengthen States rights, but rather a call to establish an effective and clear 
balance between national and State responsibilities.  This reflects the view of the 
former Prime Minister, John Howard, who stated that:107 
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Brazilian Federal State’.  Democracy (Organization of American States, Washington/DC, Spring 
2000), 2-7.  
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… I have never been one to genuflect uncritically on the altar of States’ 
rights.  Our Federation should be about better lives for people, not quiet 
lives for Governments. 
It has been suggested that the reallocation of constitutional powers could largely be 
achieved in practice without the need for formal constitutional amendment.  While 
this may be possible, and may well be the only practical way of enacting agreed 
reforms in the short to medium term, it would ultimately be preferable and proper to 
enact any proposed changes through the formal amendment procedure provided under 
s. 128.  As Twomey concluded:108 
This ensures that the people are consulted and give their imprimatur to 
the change and also prevents backsliding or repudiation by future 
governments. 
7.2. Processes for Enhancing Cooperation Between the Various Levels of 
Australian Government. 
7.2.1. Reforming the Senate 
The Senate was originally intended as the States house, but has increasingly moved 
away from this intended role.  The central role occupied by political parties in the 
Australian political system means that the primary loyalty of individual Senators is 
now generally to the political party on which their pre-selection depends, rather than 
to their home State.  Given that the same party political divide also permeates the 
State level of government it is difficult to see that devolving the power to appoint 
Senators to the State Parliaments would actually make any practical difference.109  
There are, however, other reforms that have been suggested that may help to give the 
Senate a stronger role in supporting the federal balance.  The first of these is the 
suggestion that a permanent Senate Standing Committee on Federal-State Relations 
                                                 
108  Ibid, 63. 
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should be established.  The second is the suggestion by the Victorian Federal-State 
Relations Committee:110 
That Senators be given the right to appear before the Parliament of the 
State from which they are elected, to report on a regular basis and answer 
questions on matters of concern to the State.  The intention was to make 
Senators focus more on their role as representatives of the State, as well 
as to increase their understanding of matters of importance to the States. 
While this reform could not be expected, on its own, to be sufficient to entirely restore 
the federal balance, there are likely to be significant benefits that flow from 
encouraging greater communication and cooperation between the State Parliaments 
and the individual Senators who are selected to represent each particular State. 
7.2.2. Strengthening the Council of Australian Governments 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) was established in May 1992, but 
has had an equivocal history as a mechanism for delivering national reforms.  While 
there have been some significant reforms delivered through COAG, its achievement 
have been ‘sporadic and unreliable’ and ‘its effectiveness has waxed and waned 
depending upon personalities and political events’.111  There is, however, a clear need 
for better co-operative mechanisms both to deal with areas of shared responsibility in 
the federal system and to encourage a co-operative form of federalism.  The 
suggestion by the Business Council of Australia for the institutionalisation and 
strengthening of COAG is a worthy one, and a reform that could be effectively 
enacted with relative ease.112  The Business Council of Australia has suggested that 
this would involve strengthening the role of COAG (which would include instituting 
more regular meetings and a permanent secretariat separate from its current location 
within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet) and improving its 
accountability mechanisms.  As part of these efforts to strengthen COAG as a body 
promoting cooperative federalism it has also been suggested that ‘efforts should be 
made to remove the perception of COAG as a creature of the Commonwealth by 
                                                 
110  Federal-State Relations Committee, Federalism and the Role of the States: Comparisons and 
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ensuring that the timing, chairing, hosting and agendas of meetings are determined 
jointly rather than by the Commonwealth alone’.113 
It is also proposed that COAG should be given an enhanced and formalised role in 
certain policy areas.  One obvious example is the Commonwealth’s signing and 
ratification of treaties under the external affairs power.  As discussed above, the 
external affairs power under s. 51(xxix) of the Constitution has been given an 
expansive interpretation by the High Court. The proliferation of treaties has led to an 
expansion of Commonwealth powers at the expense of the State as ‘[s]imply by 
entering into a treaty, the Commonwealth Government can give the Commonwealth 
Parliament what is in effect a new head of legislative power’.114 
There are currently formal mechanism designed to encourage consultation with State 
and Territory Governments before treaties are entered into.  The key consultative 
body is the Treaties Council within COAG, while the Commonwealth-State-
Territories Standing Committee on Treaties is another potentially significant 
consultative mechanism.  COAG attempted to place the consultative process on a 
more formal footing with the adoption of the Principles and Procedures for 
Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties in 1996. 
While consultation is to be encouraged, the insufficient and often symbolic nature of 
the current mechanisms is evident from an examination of the Principles and 
Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties.  For example, 
Principle 3.1 provides115: 
In the interests of achieving the best possible outcome for Australia and 
where a treaty or other international instrument is one of sensitivity and 
importance to the States and Territories, the Commonwealth should, 
wherever practicable, seek and take into account the views of the States 
and Territories, in formulating Australian negotiating policy, and before 
becoming a party to, or indicating acceptance of, that treaty or 
instrument. 
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The use of phrases such as ‘wherever possible’ and ‘take into account’ highlights the 
discretionary and largely symbolic nature of the consultative mechanism.  In practice, 
the burden of implementing the obligations imposed under international treaties 
entered into by the Commonwealth effectively falls on the States where those treaties 
relate to areas of State policy responsibility.  Although the Commonwealth is the 
signatory who will be held liable at the international level for any failure to confirm to 
its obligations, where treaties imposed obligations that impact upon areas of State 
responsibility it is the States at the domestic level who face the prospect of being 
required to shape their behaviour by reference to the treaty.  The alternative is to face 
the prospect of the Commonwealth deciding to assert the constitutional authority that 
is granted to it by the external affairs power under s 51(xxix) of the Constitution.  The 
external affairs power in this way effectively allows the Commonwealth to enter into 
policy areas not otherwise covered by the enumerate powers of the Constitution in 
order to ensure that it meets its international obligations.  The Commonwealth 
Government is therefore effectively free to enter into treaties at the international level 
that directly impact upon the States at the domestic level, over and above any 
objections that may be put forward by the States.116   
While recognising that it is necessary to speak with one voice at the international level 
and that only the Commonwealth Government can ultimately have responsibility for 
entering into treaties on behalf of Australia, it is submitted that the States should be 
given a more substantive role in this process.  This could be done either by providing 
for a process of approval by State Parliaments or, recognising the delays that might 
result from the previous suggestion, by requiring that the Treaties Council be given a 
more substantive role.  This may include a power of veto over a prospective treaty, 
where the proposed treaty is one that impacts on areas of State activity.  Such a 
process could be incorporated into the existing consultation process that is undertaken 
when Australia is considering becoming a party to an international treaty, but before 
the treaty is ultimately signed and ratified. 
7.3. Financial Relations Between Federal and State Governments 
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Probably the area in which reform is most urgently needed is in the financial relations 
between federal and state governments.  This federal-state relationship has been 
characterised by an ever-increasing accumulation of financial power on the part of the 
federal government and ever-decreasing claims to financial independence on the part 
of the state governments.  The States have been described as ‘institutionalized 
beggars’117 – a somewhat crude, and yet revealing metaphor. Deakin’s prescient claim 
that the States were ‘legally free, but financially bound to the chariot wheels of 
Central Government’118 presents a realistic picture of the current state of affairs. 
This increasingly unequal financial relationship has potentially broader consequences 
for the federal balance in terms of the allocation of responsibilities.  The limited 
financial capacities of the States as compared to the Commonwealth tend to fuel 
arguments that the Commonwealth should enter areas that have traditionally been 
State responsibilities.  As Twomey and Withers have observed:119 
It is disingenuous to suggest that the States are failing in their 
responsibilities because they require Commonwealth funding and that the 
Commonwealth should therefore take over State policy functions, when 
this is the system that the Commonwealth deliberately created. 
The financial relations between federal and state governments, and proposals for 
reform, will be considered below in terms of the need to reduce both the vertical fiscal 
imbalance and the use of specific purpose payments, as well as the need to revisit the 
extent of horizontal fiscal equity. 
7.3.1. Reducing Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
The term vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) describes ‘a mismatch between the revenue 
raising powers and expenditure responsibilities of each level of government, where a 
short-fall in revenue for one level of government (typically the regional level) is made 
up for by grants funded from the surplus revenue of the other (typically the central 
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government)’.120  In a federal system some level of VFI is realistically to be 
expected,121 but it is broadly seen as desirable to aim for an approximate level of 
fiscal equivalence, where the revenue raising powers and expenditure responsibilities 
of each level of government are balanced.  The central advantage of fiscal equivalence 
is that it ‘enhances accountability and responsibility, as the same government has to 
make the hard choices related to balancing tax and expenditure levels’.122 
The Australian federal system is characterised by one of the highest levels of VFI 
amongst federal systems across the world.  The result of this is that the States are 
increasingly dependent on the national government for funding.  For example, the 
WA Department of Treasury and Finance has estimated that the WA government 
relies on the national government for approximately 50% of its total operating 
revenue.123  Statistics from the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2005 showed that the 
national government directly collected approximately 82% of taxes, of which 
approximately 27% is transferred back to State governments.  On the other hand, 
State governments undertake 40% of public spending in Australia, evidencing a 
significant VFI.124  This comparatively high level of VFI ‘largely reflects the erosion 
since Federation of the States’ revenue powers as seen in the transfer of income taxes 
to the national government, the abolition of a range of State taxes under the 1999 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial 
Relations (IGA), and the broad interpretation given to s 90 of the Constitution by the 
High Court of Australia’.125 
Such a stark degree of VFI is not desirable.  Their increasing reliance on grants from 
the national government means that States are, to a growing extent, no longer the 
masters of their own financial destiny.  This has a number of consequences including, 
as described above, a reduction in accountability and fiscal responsibility.  It also 
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‘exposes State government to budget uncertainty vis-à-vis Australian government 
decisions about the level of grants’,126 allows the national government to use its 
heightened fiscal leverage to force its way into policy areas traditionally reserved to 
the States, and also ‘reduces incentive for States to put in place growth promoting 
policies and infrastructure, as the tax benefits flow primarily to the 
Commonwealth’.127 
The IGA, which was signed by the Federal and State Governments in June 1999, was 
meant to improve this situation by providing States with access to a growth revenue 
stream by the Federal Government agreeing to allocate GST revenues to the States.  
The WA Department of Treasury and Finance argues, however, that this has actually 
increased the financial dependence of State Governments on the Federal Government, 
observing that under the IGA ‘… the States have abolished a number of their own 
taxes … so that there are less revenue sources under the State’s direct control’128 and 
that ‘States cannot choose (individually or collectively) to increase their revenue from 
the GST because the GST is an Australian Government tax and the IGA provides that 
amendments to the GST require unanimous agreement of the Australian Government 
and all State Governments’.129 
A number of reforms aimed at reducing the VFI within the Australian federal system 
have been suggested over the years.  These tend to involve either providing State 
governments with a greater share of overall taxation revenue or enhancing the ability 
of State governments to raise their own funds.  One such suggestion is for the States 
to return to imposing their own personal income tax.  There is no constitutional 
impediment to the States collecting income tax, and in fact they did so prior to 1942.  
This is not an unusual arrangement with, for example, state and provincial 
governments in the USA and Canada collecting their own personal income taxes in 
addition to income taxes levied by the national government.  This would have the 
advantage of reducing VFI and reducing the financial reliance of the States on 
Commonwealth transfers, however the Business Council of Australia has warned that 
‘any increase in the tax bases of States would need to be offset by equivalent 
reductions in Commonwealth taxes’ and that there would be a need to avoid ‘the 
                                                 
126  Ibid, 14. 
127  Ibid,. 
128  Ibid, 17. 
129  Ibid. 
42 
 
potential for increased administrative burdens dealing with a more fragmented tax 
system’.130 
An alternative reform proposal – which would still achieve the aim of reducing VFI 
while also addressing concerns about the overall tax burden and avoiding additional 
administrative burdens – is to introduce a formal tax-sharing arrangement, with the 
States provided with a guaranteed percentage of Commonwealth tax revenue.  In 
addition to reducing VFI this would also have the benefit of providing all States with 
a direct interest in the economic success of all other States, with increasing economic 
growth directly benefiting them through corresponding increases in taxation revenues.  
A formal tax-sharing arrangement would likely also reduce State reliance on specific 
purpose payments by increasing the revenue available to them on an unconditional 
basis, which is itself a considerable benefit for reasons expanded upon below.  Such 
an arrangement would not, of course, be a perfect solution for the States.  It would 
not, for example, provide the States with the independence and enhanced budget 
flexibility that they would gain from levying their own taxes.  It would potentially, 
however, be a significant improvement over current arrangements as it would reduce 
VFI and provide greater certainty and transparency in the financial relationship 
between the federal and state levels of government. 
7.3.2. Reducing Specific Purpose Payments 
The expansion of specific purpose payments (SPPs) has further eroded the financial 
independence of the States and allowed the Commonwealth to enter into policy areas 
that have previously been the exclusive provinces of the States.  The conditions that 
are attached by the Commonwealth to these payments effectively allow the 
Commonwealth to impose policy directions and programs on the States, without the 
limitation of requiring any connection to specific Commonwealth constitutional heads 
of power.  They also significantly constrain State discretion and freedom in allocating 
their own budgets and designing their own programs.  The use of SPPs continues to 
be significant.  As Twomey and Withers outlined:131 
In the 2006-07 financial year there [were] at least 90 distinct SPP 
programs providing $28 billion to the States or directly to non-
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government schools and local governments.  SPPs account for 42% of 
total payments made by the Commonwealth to the States.  The 
requirements in many SPPs that States match funding and maintain 
existing efforts means that up to 33% of State budget outlays can be 
effectively controlled by SPPs, reducing State budget flexibility. 
In 2008 COAG agreed to significant reforms to the arrangements for SPPs.  The new 
framework was outlined in the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial 
Relations, which commenced operation on 1 January 2009.  A key feature of the new 
agreement was the rationalisation of SPPs, which were reduced from over 90 
payments to five, namely in the areas of healthcare, schools, skills and workplace 
development, disability services and affordable housing.  This was designed to 
increase flexibility by allowing funds to be spent by the States within the relevant 
sector, providing greater discretion to the States in terms of the allocation of the 
payments to specific projects.  The Agreement also involved a new form of payments, 
namely a National Partnership Payment which is designed ‘to fund specific projects 
and to facilitate and/or reward States that deliver on nationally significant reforms’.132  
The overall amount of money provided in payments for specific purposes (including 
both SPPs and National Partnership Payments) continues to be significant, with an 
estimated total of $50.1 billion being allocated in 2009-10, which equates to 14.8% of 
total Commonwealth expenditure.133 
The increased use of SPPs has obvious consequences for the federal balance, with 
Ross Garnaut commenting that:134 
There is a sense in which [SPPs] have completely undermined the federal 
character of government in Australia. 
SPPs allow the Commonwealth to assert ‘financial and policy control over the States’ 
and ‘are the primary cause of duplication, excessive administrative burdens, blame-
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shifting and waste in our federal system’.135  Reducing the use of SPPs in favour of 
general purpose grants should be a priority for the reform of the Australian federation. 
7.3.3. Revising Horizontal Fiscal Equalization 
In addition to its comparatively high degree of VFI (when compared against other 
federations such as Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the USA) the Australian 
Federation is also characterised by a substantial degree of horizontal fiscal 
equalization (HFE).136  The Commonwealth Grants Commission applies the HFE 
principle when advising the Commonwealth government on the allocation of GST 
revenue between the States.  It describes the principle of fiscal equalisation as 
requiring that ‘each State should be given the capacity to provide the average standard 
of State-type public services, assuming it does so at an average level of operational 
efficiency and makes an average effort to raise revenue from its own sources’.137  In 
simple terms, it is an attempt to adjust Commonwealth transfers to the States to 
equalize the capacity of both weaker and stronger States to provide services to their 
citizens. 
While most recognise that ‘mechanisms that assist fiscally weaker States are generally 
considered to be fair and conducive to a well functioning federation’138 there are also 
costs and disadvantages attached to this process.  Most importantly, the equalization 
process ‘provides great disincentives for sub-national governments to seek and 
provide efficient delivery of government services’.139  The current system has been 
estimated to create ‘deadweight losses of between $150 and $280 million per 
annum’.140 
There is also increasing concern being expressed about the current equalisation 
formula and particularly its failure to adequately recognise the infrastructure costs and 
related pressures that are being experienced by States with high levels of economic 
growth.  The argument for reform is being driven most strongly by Western Australia, 
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with the Premier recently observing that changes announced to the funding formula 
would ‘short-change’ Western Australia in that it would:141 
… strip $443 million from WA’s share of GST funding next year … 
Under this proposal, for every dollar Western Australians pay in GST 
they will only be receiving 68 cents back.  Meanwhile people in New 
South Wales will receive a return of 95 cents, Victorians will receive 93 
cents and Queenslanders will receive a return of 91 cents. 
Premier Barnett stated that if Western Australia received an equal per capita share of 
the GST the State would be $1.5 billion better off in 2010-11,142 and noted that within 
three years, using the amended funding formula ‘… for every dollar of GST that 
Western Australians pay at the register, we will only get back 57 cents’.143 
There is considerable merit in the proposal that a floor should be applied to the 
equalization formula, with a States share of GST revenues unable to fall below that 
minimum level.  While some level of equalization is broadly accepted as being in the 
broader national interest and as the price of being a member of the Federation, there 
does seem to be a point at which the costs outweigh the benefits, the disincentives 
limiting growth-creating policies and investment begin to negatively affect our future 
economic prosperity, and where there is a real risk of a growing resentment amongst 
citizens in the fiscally stronger States that may undermine national unity.  Exactly 
when this point will be reached is a matter of conjecture, however with the Mining 
Minister of Western Australia, The Hon. Norman Moore MLC, recently speaking of 
‘rumblings of secession’144 in response to any moves by the Commonwealth to 
‘plunder the revenues of Western Australia’,145 it is clear that the financial 
relationship between the Commonwealth and the States continues to be a contentious 
political issues. 
7.4. Possible Constitutional Amendments 
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7.4.1. Federalism as an Express Constitutional Principle 
There are numerous examples of federalism, and the need to maintain the federal 
balance, being recognised as a foundational principle informing the Australian 
Constitution and resulting governmental structure.  The most explicit reference is 
found in the Preamble, which refers to the people agreeing ‘to unite in one 
indissoluble Federal Commonwealth’.  Similarly, s. 3 of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) refers to the people of the several Australian 
colonies being ‘united in a Federal Constitution’.   
There are also numerous references to federalism as a constitutional value that should 
inform our reading of the Constitution and the interpretation of the respective powers 
of the different levels of government.  For example, Chief Justice Gibbs recognised in 
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen that ‘in determining the meaning and scope of a power 
conferred by s 51 it is necessary to have regard to the federal nature of the 
Constitution’.146  That view was also expressed in the same case by Justice 
Stephen.147  In Queensland Electricity Commission v The Commonwealth Chief 
Justice Gibbs recognised that ‘the purpose of the Constitution was to establish a 
Federation’ and, again, concluded that ‘the federal nature of the Constitution’ 
imposed limits upon the powers granted by s. 51.148  Cooperation between the 
Commonwealth and State governments was considered by Justice Deane to be ‘a 
positive objective of the Constitution’ in R v Duncan; ex parte Australian Iron & 
Steel Pty Ltd.149   
The dissenting judges in the Work Choices Case also emphasised the federal nature of 
the Constitution.  Justice Kirby stated that the High Court ‘needs to give respect to the 
federal character of the Constitution’.150  In a similar vein, Justice Callinan concluded 
that ‘the Constitution mandates a federal balance’, calling this ‘a powerful 
constitutional implication’.151  
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There is, however, considerable evidence suggesting that federalism is not generally 
accepted as an entrenched constitutional principle that necessarily informs the 
interpretation of the Constitution.  The majority judges in Work Choices emphasised 
that the starting point when interpreting the Constitution will necessarily be ‘the 
constitutional text, rather than a view of the place of the States that is formed 
independently of that text’.152  This reflects the earlier statement of the Court in the 
Engineers Case that the Constitution should not be interpreted by reference to ‘a 
vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact’.153  More expressly, in Re 
Wakim; Ex parte McNally, Justice McHugh emphasised that ‘cooperative federalism 
is not a constitutional term.  It is a political slogan, not a criterion of constitutional 
validity or power’.154 
Lynch and Williams have argued that federalism is ‘not viewed as a constitutional 
value sufficiently anchored in the text’155 and have suggested that an express 
‘constitutional mandate’ is required before the principle will be formally recognised 
as a factor properly to be applied in the task of constitutional interpretation.  As they 
have observed:156 
… it seems that the weight of precedent will prevent the High Court 
departing anytime soon from the orthodoxy that the Constitution’s 
establishment of a federal system does not provide a sufficient basis for 
consideration of the relationship between the Commonwealth and States 
as a factor in the interpretation of their respective powers.  
A ‘constitutional mandate’ could be achieved by the inserting into the constitution 
express recognition of federalism as a guiding constitutional value and of the 
maintenance of the federal balance as a factor that must be applied when interpreting 
the Constitution and (in particular) the scope of Commonwealth powers.  An express 
reference in the constitutional text would go some way to redressing the significant 
expansion of Commonwealth powers that has been facilitated by the generally 
centralist approach of the High Court towards constitutional questions.  It would help 
to ensure that federalism is ‘transformed from assumption and aspiration into 
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constitutional text’157 and to address the current problem of the federal character of 
the Constitution being too readily ignored in the interpretation of this foundational 
document. 
7.4.2. The Appointment of High Court Justices 
As the ‘keystone of the federal arch’158 the High Court of Australia is charged with 
being the final arbiter in constitutional disputes, including disputes between the States 
and Commonwealth as to the limits of their respective powers.  Under s. 72(i) of the 
Constitution the High Court Justices are appointed by the Governor-General in 
Council.  With all High Court appointments being made by the Commonwealth 
government it is entirely unsurprising that the High Court has, over time, been 
broadly sympathetic towards the expansion of Commonwealth powers.  The 
appointment of the neutral umpire by one of the two competing teams would never be 
allowed in any of our professional sporting codes.  It is difficult to see why it should 
be allowed to occur in relation to the much more important task of appointments to 
the High Court of Australia. 
There have been periodic calls for States to be given a role in the appointment of High 
Court Justices, with a variety of mechanisms being suggested.  The issue has been 
acknowledged to an extent by s. 6 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), 
which provides: 
Where there is a vacancy in the office of Justice, the Attorney-General 
shall, before an appointment is made to the vacant office, consult with 
the Attorneys-General of the States in relation to the appointment. 
While s. 6 acknowledges the need to provide the States with some input into the 
appointment process, it is nothing more than a symbolic gesture.  There is nothing 
requiring the consultation process to be anything other than cursory, and nothing to 
guarantee the States any substantive input into the eventual outcome. 
It is difficult to argue against the general proposition that both Commonwealth and 
State governments should have some role in the appointment of High Court Justices.  
Under the Constitution neither level of government is ‘superior’ to the other, and with 
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the Court granted original jurisdiction in all matters of constitutional dispute between 
the Commonwealth and the States159 and exercising appellate jurisdiction over the 
State Supreme Courts160, the States have as much of a direct interest as the 
Commonwealth government in appointments to the Court.  Three primary objections 
that seem to have been raised most frequently against this general proposition, with 
each of these being directly addressed by Craven in his paper Reforming the High 
Court.161 
The first is that ‘it would lead to an orgy of political horse-trading behind closed 
doors’.162  Craven argues that while this may be true to some extent, it can surely be 
no different to what occurs at the moment within the Cabinet and Party Rooms. 
The second is that the involvement of the States would inevitably produce 
compromise candidates.  To this, Craven observes:163 
This may be true, but it is not clear why it is undesirable.  It may well be 
that the best candidates in practice are those who enjoy a significant 
degree of confidence among a wide range of Governments and their 
Attorneys, rather than those who arouse the unbridled passion of the 
Commonwealth government alone. 
The third is that involving the States ‘would give undue prominence to regional 
considerations’.164  In response, Craven stated:165 
… one could be forgiven for believing that ‘regional considerations’ 
should be given a very greater prominence in the appointment of High 
Court Justices, on the grounds that the States and the Commonwealth in 
reality have a roughly equal interest in the operation of the Court. 
If we accept that the States, as a matter of general principle, should be granted a 
substantive voice in the appointment of High Court Justices, the question then 
becomes one of the appropriate mechanism.  The challenge here is to find a system of 
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appointment that allows the States a substantive role whilst still maintaining the 
overall integrity of the appointment process.  One such proposal has been put forward 
by the Queensland Government in 1983 to the Australian Constitutional Convention.  
This proposal has subsequently been endorsed by Gabriel Moens, who described it as 
follows:166 
… upon a vacancy occurring on the High Court bench, the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General asks the State Attorneys-General 
for suggestions of possible appointees.  The Commonwealth itself 
may then submit suggestions of potential appointees to the scrutiny of 
the State Attorneys-General.  From this consultation the 
Commonwealth would gain a clear idea about which candidates met 
with State approval or disapproval.  High Court vacancies could only 
be filled with prospective appointees of whom the Commonwealth 
government approved and of whom three (or more) State governments 
had expressed positive approval or had not expressed an opinion upon. 
There are a number of advantages to this proposal.  Most importantly, it would be a 
step towards restoring the federal balance by ensuring that both Commonwealth and 
State governments play a substantive role in the appointment process.  It may also be 
the case that – far from leading inevitably to ‘compromise candidates’ – the new 
process may ultimately result in candidacies of equal, or even better, quality.  The 
proposed model would require real consultation, and as Craven observed:167 
… the general point must be that it is far from clear why we should be so 
eager to rely upon the judgment of a single government in choosing a 
High Court Justice as the best guarantee of quality, rather than the 
collected wisdom of a number of governments. 
7.4.3. Proposing Constitutional Amendments 
A similar issue has been raised in relation to the initiation of referenda proposing 
constitutional amendments.  Under the present amendment procedures only the 
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Commonwealth Parliament has the power to initiate a referendum regarding a 
proposed constitutional amendment.168  Given this, it is hardly surprising to note that 
of the 44 amendment proposals put forward under s. 128 of the Constitution, over half 
of them (23 to be exact) have attempted to expand Commonwealth powers.  Further, 
these proposals have proven consistently unpopular amongst the Australian people, 
with only two of the 23 proposals being approved.169  As Jeffrey Goldsworthy has 
noted:170 
No Commonwealth government has ever sponsored a constitutional 
amendment to reduce Commonwealth powers, and none is ever likely to 
do so. 
Not allowing the States to initiate referenda has obvious negative consequences for 
the federal balance by effectively excluding proposals that suggest that 
Commonwealth government powers be limited.  It is difficult to see the justification 
for excluding the States from this process.  As Goldsworthy observed:171 
Although each State may represent only part of the nation, they are all 
very important parts, and together they constitute almost all of it.  
Moreover, the whole point of a federation is that its parts have 
constitutional standing, and guaranteed rights and powers.  The parts no 
less than the whole are legitimate stake-holders in any federal 
constitution.  If a majority of those parts believe that the constitution 
could be approved, why should they not be able to put their case directly 
to the people? 
The proposal to amend the Constitution to allow States to initiate referenda has been 
previously endorsed.  It formed one of the recommendations of the Final Report of the 
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Constitutional Commission172 and has been approvingly referred to by academics 
such as Goldsworthy173 and Twomey.174  To prevent a sudden rush of frivolous 
amendment proposals, and recognising the significant costs involved in holding a 
referendum, it is generally acknowledged that a minimum number of State 
Parliaments should be required to approve the proposed amendment in identical terms 
before it is put to the people for approval.  The Final Report of the Constitutional 
Committee put this recommendation in the following terms:175 
A proposal to alter the Constitution would be required to come from the 
Parliaments of not fewer than half the States.  There should be an 
additional requirement that the State Parliaments concerned represent a 
majority of Australians overall.  It would be a requirement that the 
proposed alteration be passed in identical terms by the State Parliaments 
concerned within a 12 month period.  The proposed alteration would be 
required to be put to referendum not less than two months nor more than 
six months after this requirement was satisfied. 
We would agree with this recommendation, with the exception of the requirement that 
the State Parliaments concerned represent a majority of Australians overall.  Including 
that requirement will greatly diminish the impact of this proposal, as it would 
effectively mean that the smaller states would be completely unable to propose 
constitutional referenda unless they had the support of either New South Wales or 
Victoria.  If this majority requirement is included the proposal will have a 
significantly reduced impact in terms of promoting a strong federal system. 
Allowing the States to initiate referenda is a reform that addresses the 
overwhelmingly centralist-tendency of past referenda, strengthens the Federation, and 
would ‘enhance the right of the people to determine the content of their 
Constitution’.176  As noted by Goldsworthy:177 
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The States as well as the Commonwealth make up the federal system, and 
have an equal stake in its proper functioning and an intimate knowledge of 
its day to day operations.  They are as well placed as the Commonwealth 
to detect structural deficiencies which need reform, deficiencies which for 
reasons of its own the Commonwealth might not want to rectify.  To 
prevent the people from rectifying such deficiencies is unfair to them even 
more than it is unfair to the States. 
Conclusion 
This article has identified a number of key issues and priorities for the reform of the 
Australian Federation. A federal system of government remains the best political 
structure for Australia, however the continual expansion of Commonwealth powers 
has resulted in a Federation far removed from that originally envisaged by the 
framers.  Along the way, many of the advantages of federalism have either been lost, 
or are not being realised to their full extent.  The reforms suggested in this paper are 
designed to improve and strengthen the day-to-day operation of federalism in 
Australia, primarily by restoring the federal balance between the Federal and State 
levels of government.  It is clear that there are significant challenges facing our 
federal system, with a national process of reform offering the opportunity to revitalize 
the Federation and ensure that the ‘federal dividend’ is fully realised for all 
Australians. 
 
 
